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Abstract 
The main aim of this paper is to analyse possible persistent French neo-colonialism in Africa. The 
first section deals with the theoretical framework of the term under scrutiny, followed by an 
analysis of the genesis of contemporary French foreign policy towards Africa by comparing the 
French presidential administrations, as well as analysing the persistent French military presence in 
Africa. The paper also focuses on the study of France’s relations with African countries using the 
example of Côte d’Ivoire and of the French military intervention during the civil war in Côte 
d’Ivoire (2002). The paper discusses the main consequences of French interventions in the region, 
and the result of the analysis is a comprehensive assessment of current mutual relations and of the 
current French influence in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Keywords: foreign policy, colonialism, Africa, France, Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In world history, we find several power struggles that have drastically 
transformed the international political arena, the boundaries of the conquered 
territory, and have significantly affected the indigenous peoples that had 
colonial powers under their control. France – as one of the most powerful 
colonial powers in modern history
1
 – has conquered a vast area of sub-Saharan 
Africa until the formation of the national-liberation movements in the 1960s. 
                                               
*  Kristína Krupová is a PhD student at the Department of International Political Relations at 
the Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava 
(kristina.krupova@euba.sk). 
**  Ľubomír Čech is Associate Professor, Head of the Department of International Political 
Relations at the Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava 
(lubomir.cech@euba.sk). 
1  French colonial rule in the world took various forms from the beginning of the 17th 
century until the 1960s. At the time of the greatest colonial supremacy, only the British 
Empire exceeded the expansiveness of France. In History World, “History of the French 
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One of the most ambiguous issues and, at the same time, the main goal of 
our paper is to examine recent claims regarding whether the nature of the 
relationship between France and Africa can be qualified as “neo-colonialism” or 
not. From the methodological point of view, we focus on the comprehensive 
analysis based on the collected data which postulates arguments about a 
possible French neo-colonial influence in Africa. The most important aspect 
under the scrutiny is the correct examination of key elements of French foreign 
policy towards Africa. Thus, from the perspective of the content of the paper, 
apart from a significant historical aspect, a political-security determinant is 
crucial, as it has greatly shaped the current features of the interactions of the 
examined subjects across the history of Franco-African relations. To support 
our reflection on the issue, we consider a neo-colonial model operating 
predominantly with the above-mentioned determinant as the core of 
understanding the current French foreign policy towards Africa. We do not 
concentrate intensively on the social and economic aspects determining the 
direction of the current foreign policy towards Africa, because the scope of the 
submitted paper does not allow us to examine these areas in depth. However, 
we also consider some of the economic aspect of the analysis, in the case study 
of Côte d’Ivoire in the next section of the paper.
2
 
The first section of the paper deals predominantly with the theoretical 
basis of neo-colonialism. We also place great emphasis on the genesis of 
contemporary French foreign policy towards Africa, by comparing the French 
presidential administrations, as well as by analysing the French military 
presence in Africa. The final part focuses on the analysis of France’s relations 
with an African country using the example of Côte d’Ivoire and the critical 
analysis of the French military intervention during the civil war in Côte 
d’Ivoire, as well as the evaluation of the current situation in this country, and an 
assessment of the consequences of French interventions in the region. 
Despite its seemingly historical context, we would like to highlight the 
current impact of the former French colonial rule by analysing France’s current 
foreign policy towards Africa, and the multiple vectors that influenced the 
current state of mutual relations. Addressing Franco-African relations, President 
François Mitterrand said that “Without Africa, there would be no history in 
                                                                                                                   
Empire,” accessed November 5, 2019, http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/Plain 
TextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=oxy#132. 
2  Obviously, e.g. the fact that the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, used by French-
speaking African countries, contributed significantly to the development of French policy 
towards Africa. However, at the same time, there is no record that this would affect 
France’s military policy. Therefore, we do not pay too much attention to this issue in the 
next analysis of the work. In Kenneth B. Noble, “French Devaluation of African Currency 
Brings Wide Unrest,” The New York Times, February 23, 1994, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/23/world/french-devaluation-of-african-currency-
brings-wide-unrest.html. 
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France in the 21st century,” which only proves that modern-day French political 
elites realize the importance of maintaining close relations with African countries.
3
 
The current discourse on migratory flows to Europe is one of the most 
‘pressing’ issues facing Europe today. The political debate on the migration 
crisis is, of course, linked to the former colonial ties of the largest European 
economies, including France, as migrants from the former colonies represent the 
highest percentage of immigrants to Europe. Despite the geographic proximity 
of France and the African continent, the issue is insufficiently debated in a 
Central European context. As our region lacks greater objectivity about the 
relevant causes of current immigration processes, we consider it necessary to 
analyse in more detail one of the precursors of the current state - the relationship 
of former colonies with their metropolises. In our opinion, this also significantly 
shapes the current domestic political environment of European countries in 
connection with migration and social inclusion of newcomers. Thus, with this 
paper we would like to interpret the main principles of French interventionism, 
as a similar study in this region is absent. 
 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
The validity of colonialism has been the subject of scrutiny by many 
scholars, as it has been difficult for many theorists to evaluate ideas of justice 
with European sovereignty over “non-Western” nations. In the 19
th
 century, the 
discrepancy between liberal ideas and colonial practice was most tangible, as 
Europe’s dominance over the rest of the world reached its peak at the time. The 
way in which the experts tried to reconcile these disparate concepts was to carry 
out partially positively-perceived Mission Civilisatrice.4 Some scholars 
persuasively demonstrate that they entail such domination, but they have also 
implied idealist and progressive agendas for intervention in the interests of the 
colonized.
5
 However, according to Afagla, the moral obligation of the people 
                                               
3  Ronald Tiersky, François Mitterrand: A Very French President (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2003), 92.  
4  This specific mission demonstrated the need for a temporary period of political and 
economic dependence until the ‘uncivilized’ society reached the point where it would be 
able to independently run the institutions and govern the territory. In Vincent Khapoya, 
The African Experience (London: Routledge, 2012), 117. 
5  For detailed analysis see e.g. David Lambert and Alan Lester, “Geographies of colonial 
philanthropy,” Progress in Human Geography, 28(3), (2004), 320–341, 
https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132504ph489oa; Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann, 
eds., Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India (London: 
Anthem Press, 2004), 362. 
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from a more advanced civilization to improve “backward” people was regularly 
advanced to justify colonial expansion.
6
 
The concepts of colonialism and imperialism are heavily used throughout the 
social sciences and humanities as part of critical theories; first and foremost, they 
owe much to Marxist thinking. Marx argued that capitalism represented a stage in 
the socioeconomic development of humanity which would be “utopianly” 
overthrown by a revolution of the working class. In 1916, Lenin specified that the 
extraordinary expansion of European imperialism around the world in the last 
decade of the 19th century had marked the highest stage of capitalism.
7
 
After independence was granted to former African colonies, as result of 
a theory of modernization, postcolonial theorists sought answers for the 
continued underdevelopment of African countries in dependency theory.
8
 
Walter Rodney, an economic theorist of postcolonial Africa, states that after 
independence the main revenue base for African countries continued to be the 
export of raw materials which resulted in the underdevelopment of African 
economies, while Western industries thrived.
9
 This fact contributed to the 
broader debate concerning the ‘new-born’ term regarding postcolonial studies – 
“neo-colonialism”. Amongst first – Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of 
independent Ghana –, in his peculiar and controversial work with Marxist, and 
simultaneously pan-Africanist influence, Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of 
Imperialism, argues that “the neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism 
in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage”, and thus he defines neo-
colonialism as “the continuation of external control over African territories by 
                                               
6  Kodjo Afagla, “Shattering the civilizing claims of colonialism: George Lamming’s 
Natives of my person,” accessed April 21, 2020, http://publication.lecames.org/index. 
php/lit/article/view/706. 
7  According to Lenin’s philosophy, the end of imperialism, as the result of World War I, 
would mark the beginning of the end of capitalism. Nevertheless, European empires 
persisted well into the 1960s. In Vladimir I. Lenin, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism,” accessed April 21, 2020, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125485/6000_ 
Imperialism_Highest_Stage_Capitalism.pdf.  
8  Dependency theory first gained prominence as way to explain the underdevelopment of 
Latin American economies in the 1960s which persisted because highly developed 
countries dominated underdeveloped economies by paying low prices for agricultural 
products and flooding those economies with cheap manufactured goods. This resulted in 
an unceasingly negative balance of payments that prevented underdeveloped countries 
from ever becoming competitive in the global marketplace. For more detailed analysis, 
see economic theorists, such as Mark Langan, Neo-Colonialism and the Poverty of 
‘Development’ in Africa (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 253; Walter Rodney, How 
Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1973), 316.  
9  Neo-colonial theorists therefore proclaimed that economies based on the production of 
cash crops such as cocoa could not hope to develop, because the world system imposes a 
veritable ceiling on the revenue that can be accrued from their production. In Walter 
Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 
1973), accessed April 24, 2020, http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/rodney-
walter/how-europe/index.htm. 
A Neo-colonialist French Foreign Policy in Africa? Insights from Côte d’Ivoire  295 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XX no. 2  2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
newer and more subtle methods than that exercised under formal empire.”
10
 The 
newest and most important form of colonial supremacy, he highlighted, was the 
diminishment of political freedoms of African countries at the expense of 
the economic influence of external forces.
11
 The goal was the same as during 
colonialism; to maintain the former colonies in a dependent position which 
allows economic exploitation.
12
 In Allen’s view-point from the American 
perspective, a neo-colonial situation was developing in the relationship between 
“whites and blacks” in the US.
13
 
As Martin implies, a first official definition of neo-colonialism was 
provided by the All-African People’s Conference in the 1961 Resolution on 
Neo-colonialism, defining it as “the survival of the colonial system in spite of 
formal recognition of political independence in developing countries, which 
become victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, 
economic, social, military, or technical means.”
14
  
According to Langan, a second method of understanding neo-colonialism 
is through foreign aid. Supporters of neo-colonial tendencies dispute that 
accepting loans from the “Western world” proved the link between independent 
African governments and the exploitative forces of former colonizers.
15
 In this 
regard, Lumumba highlights that since the early 21st century, China has been 
perceived as a neo-colonial power, that does not appear to systematically 
respect the rules of western capitalism and political systems, and offers 
speculative forms of loans to various African countries. Moreover, he states that 
neo-colonialism is different from classical colonialism only in the sense that “it 
is an ideology that is applied to a different time and space with the same or 
different actors.”
16
 
France endeavours in the long term to maintain its cultural legacy, with 
a significant portion of development funding going towards education, 
                                               
10  Kwame Nkrumah, “Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism,” accessed April 15, 
2020, https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nkrumah/neo-colonialism/introduction.htm. 
11  Amongst other scholars who expressed similar concerns about Africa’s external relations, 
see e.g. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Les Damnés de la Terre) (Paris: 
Éditions Maspero, 1961), 311. 
12  Mbuyi Kabunda Badi, “El neocolonialismo en África. Sus formas y manifestaciones,” 
accessed April 20, 2020, https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2163176. 
13  Robert L. Allen, “Reassessing the Internal (Neo) Colonialism Theory,” The Black 
Scholar, 35:1 (2005), 2-11, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00064246.2005.11413289. 
14  Guy Martin, “The historical, economic and political bases of France’s African policy,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 23(2) 1985, 189-208, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00000148. 
15  They note as evidence that most foreign aid has been given in the form of loans, bearing 
high rates of interest; repayment of these loans contributed to the underdevelopment of 
African economies because the collection of interest ultimately impoverished African 
peoples. For more information, see Langan, Neo-Colonialism, 253. 
16  Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, “China-Africa Relations: A Neo-Imperialism or a Neo-
Colonialism? A Reflection,” African and Asian Studies, n. 10: 2-3, 234-266, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/156921011X587040. 
296  KRISTÍNA KRUPOVÁ, ĽUBOMÍR ČECH 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XX  no. 2  2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
scholarships, and cultural institutes. La Francophonie is a truly neo-colonial 
concept, especially as is results in a specific type of identity building, though, as 
Martin points out,  “to the extent that it implies the inclusion of people outside 
France in the culture of France itself.”
17
  
Supporting Diana Haag’s thoughts about neo-colonialism, since the term 
supposes a combination of dependence in different forms, the presence of neo-
colonialism is determined if some of the following criteria are present: (1) 
political interference, (2) economic influence, (3) financial dependence, and (4) 
military presence.
18
 Besides all the undisputable economic and cultural 
connotations
19
 of the term neo-colonialism, on the basis of Langan’s passage 
that “neo-colonialism is a situation of infringed national sovereignty and 
intrusive influence by external elements”, we are aware that a neo-colonial 
model can be perceived also by using the political-security determinant. For this 
purpose, the case study of French foreign policy towards Africa based on the 
example of Côte d’Ivoire forms the conceptual core of our work, as France was 
one of very few external forces with a military intervention during the civil war 
in the country.  
 
 
The Current French Foreign Policy Towards Africa 
 
France’s strong motivation for maintaining a sphere of influence in 
Africa can be demonstrated in the following fragments. Indeed, in the 1950s, 
large reserves of iron and copper ore, gold and oil were discovered in West 
Africa. During the post-war period, these were strategic raw materials for 
France as well as for other powers governing these areas. France thus wanted to 
secure privileged access to these sensitive raw materials, specifically through 
French multinationals, which expanded their portfolio to the region of sub-
Saharan Africa. According to Alexandr Ort,
20
 agriculture, especially the 
                                               
17  Martin, “The historical, economic and political bases of France’s African policy,” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 23(2) 1985, 189-208, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00000148. 
18  Diana Haag, “Mechanisms of Neo-colonialism: Current French and British influence in 
Cameroon and Ghana,” ICIP Working Papers, accessed April 27, 2020, 
http://icip.gencat.cat/web/.content/continguts/publicacions/workingpapers/2011/arxius/wp
_2011-6_ing.pdf. 
19  For detailed analysis see e.g. Kwame Nkrumah, “Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of 
Imperialism,” accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nkrumah/ 
neo-colonialism/introduction.htm; Ahmed Sékou Touré, “Africa’s future and the world,” 
Foreign Affairs, 41, 141–151 (1962), DOI: 10.2307/20029606; Jack Woddis, Introduction 
to Neo-Colonialism (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1967), 133.   
20  Alexandr Ort, French colonial policy after World War II/ Francouzská koloniální politika 
po 2. světové válce (Praha: Academia, 1968), 24. 
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cultivation and processing of peanuts, also played a major role.
21
 The main 
exports of Côte d’Ivoire were coffee and cocoa, reflecting France’s significant 
interest in maintaining a strong influence not only in the political dimension, but 
also in the economic one. 
France also wanted to preserve the integrity of its colonial territory and its 
position as an important international player by creating a network of allied 
countries that, together with France, could play a major role in international politics. 
As Martin and Schraeder observe, the French influence used to work on the basis of 
a tight network of formal and informal institutions which enabled an indirect 
control over the local elite and bureaucracy.
22
 In this network the major political 
decisions regarding Africa lied almost exclusively with the French President and his 
advisor for African Affairs and included regular encounters with African leaders 
and the organisation of biannual Franco-African summits.
23
 Furthermore, it was 
very important for France to maintain a military presence in Africa, which is also 
reflected in the security determinant of French foreign policy, a significant element 
of French engagement in Africa even today. The protection and promotion of 
economic and political interests is only possible if peace and stability are ensured in 
the country, as French diplomacy has recognized. For this reason, France has 
maintained a strong military base on the African continent, which is the subject of 
an examination of the paper as a possible form of “neo-colonialism”. Therefore, the 
main aspect of the study of mutual relations is mainly the political-security 
determinant which has significantly influenced both the historical and current ties of 
the subjects concerned. 
The highest diplomatic representative and the intermediary of French 
foreign policy in the world is the President. Under the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic,
24
 the President holds the position of Supreme Army Commander, so 
in practice he decides on military operations and country interventions at home 
                                               
21  Senegal, one of the oldest colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, has become the seat of many 
French authorities, and Dakar has become a modern port and the administrative and 
cultural centre of the whole West Francophone Africa. In Ort, French colonial policy, 25.  
22  For better understanding, direct or indirect form of colonial rule is not exclusive for given 
colonial power. French colonists established also direct forms of rule in some parts of 
Senegal and indirect forms of rule in other parts. As Gerring et al. points out, Scotland 
and Wales enjoy greater autonomy from Westminster than does England; and Catalonia 
enjoys more independence from Madrid than does Andalusia. In John Gerring et al., “An 
Institutional Theory of Direct and Indirect Rule,” World Politics, vol. 63, n. 3, 2011, 377-
433, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dziblatt/files/gerring_ziblatt.pdf. 
23  Guy Martin, “Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations.” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, vol. 33(1) 1995, 1-20, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X0002082 
6;  Peter J. Schraeder, “France and the Great Game in Africa,” Current History, vol. 96, no. 
610 (1997), 206-211.  
24  Assemblée nationale, “Constitution de la République française,” accessed April 2, 2019, 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp#titre_2. 
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and abroad.
25
 The analysis of the paper allows us to understand the substance of 
contemporary French presence in Africa and the correlation of mutual African-
French relations. 
Côte d’Ivoire is amongst the most prominent economic and political actors 
on the African continent that, at the same time, represents one of the crucial French 
interests in Africa in modern history, as described in the following chapters. We 
consider the critical situation in the Côte d’Ivoire’s internal political scene in 2002, 
when the civil war culminated, as a current aspect of examining the relationship 
between Côte d’Ivoire and France. The persistent unrest during the 2010 
presidential elections has contributed to destabilizing the country’s political 
situation and has largely determined its current political and economic position in 
the region.
26
 The impact of the colonial heritage stimulated French interventions in 
this area, and made a significant contribution to the professional public’s debate on 
the legitimacy of French interventions and accusations of possible French neo-
colonialism in Africa. 
One of the main disputes amongst authors dealing with the colonial 
powers is whether direct or indirect colonial rule were in the end more harmful 
for indigenous people. Huxley expressed his view that direct colonial rule had 
smashed African tradition, producing a remnant “tissue culture of isolated 
human cells, cultivated in a rich but unhealthy broth that is a by-product of 
Western capitalism.”
27
 Hence, indirect rule experiencing mainly by British 
colonial power aimed to counteract this disintegration by strengthening the 
existing native social organism. Collier later pointed out that the “generations of 
multitudinous disaster for Indians were generations of direct rule by the United 
States; while the radical, methodical shift in the Indian New Deal – a shift to 
indirect administration, changed Indian disaster to Indian victory.”
28
 Lugard 
insisted that colonial powers had a double responsibility. Not only should they 
protect native populations and promote their development, they should also 
make available the resources of the colony to the entire world.
29
 Haag 
                                               
25  This constitutional authority is sometimes also referred to as a reserved domain from the 
French original phrase «domaine réservé» - in the free translation the sovereign 
competence of the president which arouses contradictory views on its use amongst the 
professionals. It is problematic at the time of cohabitation, when the president’s 
competence in this context is greatly complicated, as the president and the government 
come from a different political spectrum. In Katja S. Ziegler, “Domaine Réservé,” 
accessed May 15, 2019, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/ 
law-9780199231690-e1398. 
26  Fabienne Hara and Comfort Ero, “Ivory Coast on the brink,” The Guardian, accessed April 9, 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/observer/worldview/story/0.11581.859795.00.html. 
27  Julian Huxley, Africa View (London: Chatto & Windus, 1931), 130. 
28  John Collier, From Every Zenith: A Memoir (Denver: Sage Books, 1963), 345. 
29  Laurence M. Hauptman, Africa View: John Collier, The British Colonial Service and 
American Indian Policy, 1933-1945 (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 1986), 363. 
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underlines that since colonial times, both France and Britain endeavoured to 
increase their area of influence through the establishment of monetary zones, 
trade and defence agreements, and institutions like La Francophonie and the 
Common-wealth. Especially France used to nourish a deep animosity towards 
Britain, fearing that small francophone countries would turn to Britain. In the 
past Cameroon has been a good example for the French suspicion towards 
Britain. However, over the past decades this competition has decreased 
significantly, especially regarding political influence.
30
 
During the decades since the declaration of independence of African 
countries, the development of French foreign policy towards Africa has 
undergone considerable changes. As we already mentioned, Sub-Saharan Africa 
has long been regarded as the French “sovereign sphere of influence”. De 
Gaulle’s policy particularly emphasized the efforts to build a strong Europe 
based on French-German cooperation, and to maintain a strong French status on 
the international political scene. After the decolonization process in Africa in 
the 1960s, France continued to keep military bases in some countries, thereby 
strengthening its strong power position equally in the sub-Saharan region and 
giving immediate access to strategic raw materials, especially oil and uranium. 
De Gaulle’s strategy of “grandeur”
31
 postulates the concept of power, 
whose main attribute was the active, interventionist state approach linked to 
territorial control and the demonstration of military forces.
32
 The roots of this 
concept are based on the historical determinant of French foreign policy until 
the colonial rule of France on the African continent, which persisted also in the 
post-colonial era in the Black Africa region. The interventionist approach 
formed the basis of a “Gaullist consensus” on African policy and was a central 
element of French elite interests across the political spectrum.  
Despite expectations, the fall of the Berlin Wall has not significantly 
affected the situation in Africa. Although the efforts of African countries to 
progressively democratize were stronger and sought a significant shift away 
from authoritarian regimes, France did not explicitly require African countries 
to adopt democratic values.
33
 Following the collapse of the bipolar world during 
                                               
30  Haag, “Mechanisms of Neo-colonialism.” 
31  In the context of the Cold War, de Gaulle initiated a policy of grandiosity – from the 
French «grandeur». He declared that France, as a central world power, could not rely on 
other countries, e.g. the United States of America, in issues such as national security and 
prosperity. De Gaulle has therefore enforced a policy of ‘national independence’ and 
launched a nuclear program called the «Force de frappe», making France one of the 
biggest nuclear power in the world. In Serge Berstein, The Republic of de Gaulle 1958-
1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 167. 
32  Tony Chafer, “Chirac and ‘la Françafrique’: No Longer a Family Affair,” Modern & 
Contemporary France, 13:1 (2005), 7-23, https://doi.org/10.1080/0963948052000341196. 
33  The only exception from Africa is Benin, where the democratization process has been 
successfully completed. In Rachel M. Gisselquist, “Democratic Transition and 
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President François Mitterrand’s term, French military interventions in Africa 
continued. The most serious and controversial case of French involvement is the 
situation in Rwanda between 1990-1994. During this period, the French military 
forces were actively involved in training the Rwandan army.
34
 According to 
Moore, subsequent civil war and genocide in the region have contributed to 
France’s negative image on the international scene.
35
 From a global perspective, 
the controversially-perceived Rwandan genocide was for the France the end of 
the Cold War in Africa. For this reason, France has often been referred to as 
«gendarme de l’Afrique»,
36
 a power with continued influence and military 
intervention in the region.
37
 This phenomenon supports our assumptions about 
French historical neo-colonial ties which, according to our model, lie in the 
persistent military presence while securitizing the French hegemony over the 
francophone Africa.   
 
 
Changing Foreign Policy Priorities of the French Presidents 
Towards Africa  
  
As Vazanova highlights, at the time of creation of the new era of 
international relations, President Chirac had to draw up a new French approach 
in the context of international political developments after the end of the Cold 
War. He decided to resume nuclear tests in the Pacific, actively involved France 
in NATO structures, and one of the most striking elements of the Chirac 
                                                                                                                   
Democratic Survival in Benin,” Democratization, 15:4 (2008), 789-814, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340802191078.  
34  France has provided diplomatic and military support to the genocidal regime of Rwandan 
President Juvénal Habyarimanan, thereby making France’s reputation in this regard 
considerably worse and the situation is still not fully resolved. The French intervention in 
Rwanda in 1994 is known as Operation Turquoise. In Daniela Kroslak, The Role of 
France in the Rwandan Genocide (London: C Hurst & Co., 2007), 41. 
35  Jina Moore, “Rwanda Accuses France of Complicity in 1994 Genocide,” The New York 
Times, accessed May 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/ 
world/africa/rwanda-france-genocide.html.  
36  Adrien Hart, “La France, gendarme de l’Afrique?,” accessed May 4, 2019, 
http://www.slateafrique.com/2319/france-gendarme-de-l-afrique. 
37  A significant piece of the post-colonial jigsaw was France’s substantial military presence. 
This, in addition to abroad license to intervene through defence agreements with nearly 
half of Africa’s states, all helped France become known as the gendarme of Africa. With 
permanent military bases originally found in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Djibouti, 
Gabon, Cameroon and the Central African Republic, responsibility to “defend” Africa 
from Communism during the Cold War dovetailed with French interests in maintaining 
regional hegemony. In I. J. Benneyworth, “The Ongoing Relationship Between France 
and its Former African Colonies,” accessed April 23, 2020, https://www.e-
ir.info/pdf/9402. 
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administration was the extensive reform of the French army.
38
 During his 
official visits to African countries in September 1997, Chirac advocated 
established military reforms and their impact on the decline of French troops in 
the area. However, it certainly did not want to disrupt the concept of above-
standard relations with Africa and declared the preservation of the French 
military presence despite slight reform changes in military affairs. In his 
publication,
39
 Francis McNamara emphasizes that Chirac and his predecessor, 
Mitterrand, have also avoided open discussions on African affairs. 
However, the real turnaround in the African policy of France came only 
after Nicolas Sarkozy’s arrival in the presidential office in May 2007.
40
 
Attempts to stabilize Franco-African relations were perceived positively.
41
 
Particularly, Sarkozy’s reform efforts have been reflected in the negotiation of 
historic defence and military agreements to reduce the number of military forces 
in African countries. France has committed in its defence strategy to take 
responsibility for African countries in case of an external threat to stability in 
that area. We analyse this aspect on the example of the French approach at the 
time of the Côte d’Ivoire civil war, which is critically perceived as an attempt to 
maintain neo-colonial ties with the former African colony.  
President Sarkozy’s statement at the beginning of his term of office 
represented a fundamental change in France’s African policy. He said he 
welcomed the interest of other powers, such as the United States and China to 
engage in the African continent.
42
 This claim negated the policy of France’s 
historic interest in maintaining a sovereign sphere of influence in the African 
region. Thus, in relation to Africa, Sarkozy’s policy is very contradictory. On 
the one hand, he tried to solve the issue of French activity on the African 
continent, but at the same time he maintained politically opaque relations with 
some African dictators, who are still associated with his person nowadays.
43
 
                                               
38  Pavlina Vazanova, “Prezidentské volby ve Francii 2012 – srovnání zahraničních politik 
N. Sarkozyho a F. Hollandea,” accessed May 20, 2019, http://www.globalpolitics.cz/ 
clanky/prezidentske-volby-ve-francii-2012-srovnani-zahranicnich-politik-n-sarkozyho-a-
f-hollandea.  
39  Francis T. McNamara, France in Black Africa (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989), 207. 
40  Assane Thiam, “La politique africaine de Nicolas Sarkozy: rupture ou continuité?,” 
Politique étrangère, 2008/4 (Winter), 873-884, https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.084.0873.  
41 Richard Moncrieff, “French Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa Under President Sarkozy,” 
SAIIA Occasional Paper no. 107, January 2012, accessed May 20, 2019, 
http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/french-relations-with-sub-saharan-africa-under-
president-sarkozy. 
42  Henri Astier, “Sarkozy’s Africa policy shift,” BBC News, accessed April 19, 2019, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7014776.stm.   
43  Reuters reported on the provable connection of former French President Sarkozy with the 
Libyan dictator Gaddafi. The French police are investigating Sarkozy about the suspicion 
of illegal financing of his 2007 election campaign by the Libyan regime. In Brian Love 
and Emmanuel Jarry, “Former French president Sarkozy held over Gaddafi cash inquiry,” 
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At the turn of the millennium, humanitarian aid and the international fight 
against terrorism have become an essential element of French foreign policy 
towards Africa. President Hollande had limited possibilities, as the situation in 
the Sahel and Mali, which had been occupied by Islamic militant groups, 
dramatically oscillated. It was almost impossible to avoid French interventions 
in this area. The main effort of French diplomacy was to transfer more 
responsibility for peacekeeping to the international community through different 
structures (UN, EU, African organizations) to diversify as far as possible the 
risks posed by military engagement in Africa. Despite Hollande’s statements 
that France will no longer be actively involved in military interventions, the 
troops were sent to Mali and the Central African Republic.
44
 As the White 
Paper of the French Defence Strategy from 2013
45
 states, Africa was still of 
significant importance to France. Holland’s vision, however, prefigured an 
effort to release mutual Franco-African relations from any signs of French neo-
colonial influence on the African continent and create a new partnership based 
on cooperation with Africa.  
The current foreign policy towards Africa reflects President Macron’s 
undeniable efforts to address the issue of the African continent through a more 
comprehensive approach – where the spotlight of the mutual cooperation, instead of 
military presence, is mainly based on education, political and economic 
development of African countries. Pilling points out that Macron had already, as the 
first French leader born after African independence, during the 2017 election 
campaign, deemed France’s activities in Algeria a “crime against humanity”.
46
 On a 
visit to African countries, Macron has declared on several occasions that France 
will not interfere with the internal affairs of African countries, which was a sign for 
a real change in French foreign policy towards Africa.
47
 
French interventionism in Africa reached its peak in the 1980s, and 
therefore, we are currently experiencing a significant decline in French 
intervention in the world. This fact is also influenced by the current policy of all 
French presidents, whose aim was to reduce budget spending in this area. 
However, in 2013, during the François Hollande term, a military operation took 
place in Mali, which was preceded by interventions in Libya during the mandate 
of Nicolas Sarkozy as President. In the current situation, Macron seeks to ensure 
                                                                                                                   
Reuters, accessed April 24, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-sarkozy-libya/ 
former-french-president-sarkozy-held-over-gaddafi-cash-inquiry-idUSKBN1GW0RH. 
44  Tony Chafer, “Hollande and Africa Policy,” Modern & Contemporary France, 22:4, 513-
531, https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2014.957966. 
45  Ministère des Armées, “Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale 2013,” 
accessed July 20, 2019, http://fr.calameo.com/read/000331627d6f04ea4fe0e. 
46  David Pilling, “A revolution in Africa’s relations with France is afoot,” Financial Times, 
accessed May 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/8894ad6e-2650-11ea-9a4f-
963f0ec7e134. 
47  Rina Bassist, “Macron ruptures with Hollande’s Africa policy; focuses on collective 
diplomacy,” accessed April 20, 2019, https://dayan.org/content/macron-ruptures-
hollandes-africa-policy-focuses-collective-diplomacy. 
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greater involvement of African governments in the fight against terrorist groups 
in the Sahel. There are more than 3,000 French soldiers in this area, as expressed 
by the current Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian, in an 
interview.
48
 
 
 
 A Case Study of the French Approach Towards Africa  
in Côte d’Ivoire 
  
Côte d’Ivoire has been always seen as an exemplary country from 
economic as well as security standpoints.
49
 As Lawrence Alschuler points out, 
Ivorian exceptional growth implies the presence of exceptional circumstances, 
that is, conditions especially present in Côte d’Ivoire but conspicuously absent 
elsewhere in francophone West Africa. He underlines two major exceptional 
conditions of the Ivorian miracle – (1) the Ivorian uniqueness as a French 
colony and (2) the origins of the planter bourgeoisie.
50
  
Among the French colonies of West Africa, Côte d’Ivoire was unique in 
number of ways. Initially, it was unique in being a neglected colony.
51
 
According to Frank’s assumption, the French metropolis appears to have had 
especially weak exploitative ties with the colonial Côte d’Ivoire in comparison 
with neighbouring countries.
52
 The turning point in the mutual dependence was 
the introduction of cash crops
53
 after the World War II, which was to have 
a profound influence on Ivorian socio-political structure.
54
 
                                               
48  Gary K. Busch, “The U.S. and the wars in the Sahel,” accessed March 27, 2019, 
https://www.pambazuka.org/human-security/us-and-wars-sahel. 
49  Côte d’Ivoire was considered as a centre piece of French interest in Africa, together with 
Cameroon, Senegal, and Gabon, as they are a vital source of raw materials, as well as an 
important market for manufactured goods and an outlet for capital investment. In Martin, 
“The historical, economic and political.” 
50  Lawrence R. Alschuler, Multinationals and Maldevelopment: Alternative Development 
Strategies in Argentina, the Ivory Coast and Korea (London: MacMillan Press LTD, 
1998), 65. 
51  Colonial rule came late, in 1893, in comparison with neighbouring colonies. In Alschuler, 
Multinationals and Maldevelopment, 66. 
52  Andre G. Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1970), 10. 
53  The rapid expansion of cash crop exports in the 1950s set class differentiation. At the 
Ivorian core of the class structure lie the planter bourgeoisie, large number of medium-
size plantation owners and a large, rural proletariat. In Alschuler, Multinationals and 
Maldevelopment, 67. 
54  Bonnie Campbell, Social Change and Class Formation in a French West African State, 
Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines, 8:2, 285-
306 (1974), 294, https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.1974.10804437. 
304  KRISTÍNA KRUPOVÁ, ĽUBOMÍR ČECH 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XX  no. 2  2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We emphasize a third essential condition, as (3) Côte d’Ivoire’s top 
officials were prominent allies of a long-standing French colonizer in the Black 
African region, after all, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny himself was 
a minister in the French capital.
55
 However, by his death, the situation in the 
country has been substantially transformed and revolutionary leaders have been 
at the forefront of their efforts to enforce the country’s political scene. The 
ensuing riots and the outbreak of civil war have prompted French troops to 
stabilize the escalating situation. By analysing the case study from Côte d’Ivoire 
with a focus on the French military presence in the country, we want to 
highlight the continuing influence of France in the sub-Saharan region, which is 
the main aspect of this analysis. 
 The consequences of the Rwandan genocide have meant for the 
international community the need to review the approach to addressing armed 
crises on the African continent. Direct military intervention was no guarantee of 
reconciliation and stability, on the contrary, there was often a deepening of the 
unrest, which further destabilized the already bad economic and political 
situation of African countries. It was therefore necessary for French diplomacy 
to put in place adequate mechanisms that would not undermine France’s good 
relations with the francophone African states given the historical context, and 
which would also reflect the necessary change of African policy in connection 
with the events in Rwanda. President Chirac, however, externally rejected any 
interference with the internal affairs of his African allies. In view of his 
previous experience with Rwandan genocide, he was aware of the need to 
review the steps to support African regimes, as such steps have not always 
proved to be correct. 
 In the past, Côte d’Ivoire has been regarded as an exemplary African 
country, but entering the new millennium it has been facing an internal political 
crisis for almost two decades. Increasing riots grew into a civil war in 2002, and 
the country was split north and south by the government.
56
 At that time, 
relations between Paris and the Ivory President Gbagbo were tense. 
Nevertheless, as we describe more deeply in further sections, France decided to 
support Gbagbo who de facto benefited from this situation. 
 At the time of the riots in Côte d’Ivoire, President Gbagbo decided to 
apply one of the contracts he had concluded with France in the post-colonial 
period. Thus, in an initially opaque situation, France refused to intervene 
militarily in Côte d’Ivoire. At the same time, French diplomacy was aware of 
the threat of an outbreak of civil war destabilizing one of the most prosperous 
countries in West Africa. This situation also had a huge impact on the whole 
                                               
55  In the Constitution adopted in 1946, Houphouët-Boigny initiated a law abolishing all 
forms of forces labour in the territories of «d’outre-mer». In Thomas Piketty, Capital et 
Idéologie (Paris: Seuil, 2019), 401. 
56  Peter Custers, “Globalisation and War in Ivory Coast,” Economic&Political Weekly, vol. 41, 
Issue No. 19 (2006), accessed March 20, 2019, http://www.epw.in/journal/ 
2006/19/commentary/globalisation-and-war-ivory-coast.html. 
A Neo-colonialist French Foreign Policy in Africa? Insights from Côte d’Ivoire  305 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XX no. 2  2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
region, which would ultimately be reflected in the weakening of the French 
influence in the region. The reasons for the eligibility of French intervention 
were also declared by the existence of a Côte d’Ivoire military base and by the 
fact that the country was an exemplary former French colony. It launched 
Operation Licorne,
57
 which was meant to stabilize the country’s situation and 
separate the rebels and reigns. In our opinion, if the intervention of the French 
troops did not take place, the uprising would probably have stopped President 
Gbagbo, as the French interventions of Gbagbo’s regime indirectly supported it. 
 
 
Background of the Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire 
  
The escalation of tensions in the Côte d’Ivoire’s internal political scene is 
interpreted by many experts as a cultural-religious conflict
58
 between Muslims 
and Christians, including several ethnic groups from the savannah and groups of 
forest zones.
59
 This simplistic approach is supported in particular by politicians 
and media representatives, who, on the basis of these contexts, understand 
ethnicity as an innate, objectively given and unchanging essence of human 
identity and could face a confrontation in a clash with a different cultural-
ideological entity.
60
 However, taking into consideration a more comprehensive 
approach, we can say that it can be perceived as an ideologically conditioned 
intrastate destabilization process, which is an important tool, especially in the 
struggle to gain influence. Therefore, we consider the Côte d’Ivoire crisis to be 
a more complex and multilevel conflict in which ethnicity plays an important 
role but is closely linked to the issue of economic crisis, migration policy, 
political discrimination and, above all, citizenship issues. The complexity of 
these factors contributes to the ambiguous and often abused interpretation of the 
Ivoirité concept.
61
  
                                               
57  Operation Licorne represented a peaceful operation of the French armed forces. Its main 
mission was to support the UN peacekeeping mission and ensure the security of the 
population. The military operation was launched on September 22, 2002 at the beginning 
of the Côte d'Ivoire civil war. In the initial phase, it comprised 1,200 soldiers, and by the 
end of 2002 the number had increased to 2,500. In Ministère de la Défense, “Dossier de 
l'opération Licorne aux forces françaises en Côte d'Ivoire,” accessed July 14, 2019, 
http://fr.calameo.com/read/004151978987729f45fdd. 
58  Norimitsu Onishi, “2 Religions Clashing in Ivory Coast,” The New York Times, accessed 
July 15, 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/06/world/2-religions-clashing-in-ivory-
coast.html. 
59  Marcus Banks, Ethnicity: anthropological constructions (New York: Routledge, 1995), 18. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Maja Bovcon, “France’s Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte d’Ivoire and its Ethical 
Implications,” accessed March 12, 2019, http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v11/v11i1a1.pdf. 
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After Félix Houphouët-Boigny
62
 – President of Côte d’Ivoire’s for nearly 
four decades, died in 1993, there was a problem with the appointment of a new 
president. Houphouët-Boigny stated in the Constitution that, in the case of his 
death, the President of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié, will hold the 
President’s office until the end of the parliamentary term.
63
 However, Bédié was 
not able to adapt to changing conditions on the country’s internal political 
scene, nor to democratize society, and was unable to create a suitable political 
environment for the existence of multiple political parties.
64
 Thereby, the efforts 
of several of Bédié’s competitors to attack his authority, especially the leader of 
the opposition party, Front Populaire Ivorien (FPI) Laurent Gbagbo and 
reformist Alassane Ouattara from the ruling party Parti démocratique de Côte 
d’Ivoire (PDCI), had these ambitions. 
In 1999, a military coup took place, and General Gueï took power in the 
country despite not being part of the Baoulé ethnic group.
65
 The opposition led 
by Gbagbo refused to recognize the results and under considerable international 
pressure, Gueï resigned and left the post of President to Gbagbo. In this context, 
we can reflect the doctrine of ni-ni of French Prime Minister Jospin about not 
interfering with African internal affairs.
66
 Despite France’s acceptance of Gueï’s 
victory in the presidential election, it has not taken any action against the new 
president Laurent Gbagbo. Part of the population’s dissatisfaction with 
President Gbagbo’s policy affected the country’s political situation. The internal 
                                               
62  Félix Houphouët-Boigny made a significant contribution to the Côte d’Ivoire’s 
independence declaration on August 7, 1960. During the performance of Côte d’Ivoire 
President (1960-1993), he maintained close political ties with France and South Africa, 
isolating the country from the riots of military uprisings and Marxist influence in the 
region. Côte d’Ivoire has been able to develop its economy, attract foreign investment and 
become the world's largest cocoa producer, thanks to its internal stability. In Global 
Security, “Military - Ivory Coast Conflict,” accessed November 15, 2019, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast.htm. 
63  Tom Lansford, Political Handbook of the World 2014 (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2014), 338. 
64  Bédié created a highly controversial ideological concept of Ivoirité to defend the 
presidential seat. The concept defined the status of “true citizens” of Côte d’Ivoire and 
“natural” power candidates from the Akan ethnicity, more precisely Baoulé, from which 
former President Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié and most of the followers PDCI ruling party 
were. In terms of demography, there is large number of ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire. 
The largest share is held by the Akan ethnic group, which accounts for up to 42% of the 
country’s population. Akanians represent the original ethnic group, but not racially 
homogeneous ethnicity. In World Population Review, “Ivory Coast Population,” accessed 
August 10, 2019, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ivory-coast-population/. 
65  Global Security, “Military - Ivory Coast Conflict.”. 
66  Marco Wyss, “The Gendarme Stays in Africa: France's Military Role in Côte d’Ivoire,” 
African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 2013), 81-111, 
doi:10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.3.1.81. 
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conflict of the country was overtaken by a series of attacks in Abidjan,
67
 Bouaké 
and Korhogo on September 19, 2002, when armed groups detached from the 
army under General Gueï’s pursuit of a military coup.
68
 They demanded the 
resignation of then President Gbagbo, securing free and fair elections, and 
abolishing the discriminatory concept of Ivoirité. This has not been left 
unnoticed by the international community, which has made every effort to 
contribute to the end of the Côte d’Ivoire conflict.
69
 
After independence in 1960, Ivorian incomers made no bigger efforts to 
achieve a higher standard of living. This was reflected in the overall 
performance of the economy, as Côte d’Ivoire remained agriculturally oriented 
and thus became the largest cocoa producer with a 40% share of the world 
production of this commodity.
70
 This trend was slightly aggravated by the 
impact of the civil war of 2002 and the division of the country, as can be seen in 
the chart (Chart 1) showing Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa production.  
The then President Houphouet-Boigny tried to ease the interethnic 
tensions by allowing every ethnic group to be part of the political process. 
Nevertheless, he privileged representatives of Baoulé, thereby neglecting the 
northern region of the country.
71
 The pressures on social reforms have increased 
and disputes over the issue of citizenship and national affairs have escalated. 
His most striking opponents were Alassane Ouattara, who had support from the 
northern regions and economic immigrants and their descendants who refused 
to continue contributing to the country’s economic prosperity as second-class 
citizens.
72
 
Remarkable is the fact that despite the civil war in the country, there were 
functioning institutions and the middle class of the population also increased. 
                                               
67  Abidjan was the capital of Côte d’Ivoire until 1983. However, in the same year, Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, the first Côte d’Ivoire president, moved the country’s capital to his 
native village of Yamoussoukro. Nevertheless, Abidjan continued to be the economic and 
cultural centre of Côte d’Ivoire. In Tim Butcher, “Desolation and decay in capital 
showpiece,” The Telegraph, accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/ 
africaandindianocean/cotedivoire/1408736/Desolation-and-decay-in-capitalshowpiece.html. 
68  Ernest Harsch, “Fragile peace in Côte d’Ivoire,” accessed July 15, 2019, 
http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/vol17no2/172cote.htm.  
69  Cyril K. Daddieh, Historical Dictionary of Cote d’Ivoire (The Ivory Coast) (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 143. 
70  Marius Wessel and Foluke Quist-Wessel, “Cocoa production in West Africa: a review and 
analysis of recent developments,” NJAS-Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, 74-75 
(2015), p. 2. DOI: 10.1016/j.njas.2015.09.001. 
71  Arnim Langer, “Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict: Côte d’Ivoire Country 
Paper,” Human Development Report Office, Occasional Paper, 2005, accessed March 20, 
2019, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2005_langer_arnim_32.pdf. 
72  Adam Nossiter, “Opposition Forces in Ivory Coast Take Towns on 2 Fronts,” The New 
York Times, accessed April 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/world/africa/ 
30ivory.html. 
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This fact is supported by data from the World Bank database, which declares a 
constant 2% growth in the middle class
73
 in Côte d’Ivoire during the Civil War 
period. We must not forget the strategic economic and geopolitical importance 
of Côte d’Ivoire in the region as it is the main economic driving force of 
Francophone West Africa. As a result, the country absorbed significant 
immigration flows predominantly from underdeveloped countries placed in the 
inland Africa. Thus, the decline in Côte d’Ivoire’s economy would have a 
serious impact on the entire West African region. 
 
 
French Interventions – Causes and Consequences 
 
The continuing French influence in Black Africa is declared by its 
intervention as a former colonial hegemonic leader in the region. Only a few 
days after the failed military coup, France intervened almost immediately in the 
conflict.
74
 Their military intervention was justified by the government as the 
obligation to protect French citizens abroad if their lives are at risk and the host 
country is unwilling or capable to ensure their safety.
75
 Likewise, President 
Gbagbo himself asked for the help of the French army, referring to the defence 
agreements that both countries had linked since independence. France was 
authorized to intervene in the case of an external threat
76
 of disruption to Côte 
d’Ivoire’s sovereignty. France interpreted this tense situation as “an internal 
conflict and provided an assistance in the protection and evacuation of French 
citizens as well as of other nationals trying to avoid a civil war.”
77
 Therefore, it 
preferred to maintain a peaceful settlement of the dispute instead of active 
support the troops in the dispute, with which Gbagbo, who asked the French for 
active military assistance, was certainly not satisfied.
78
 However, the French 
military presence in the country was a significant obstacle to the rebels fighting 
Gbagbo’s regime, as they failed to occupy the strategic city of Abidjan 
                                               
73  World Bank, “Low & middle income,” accessed April 20, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2016&locations=XO-CI&start=1960&view=chart. 
74  Wyss, “The Gendarme Stays.”  
75  Ministère de la Défense, “Dossier de présentation de l'opération Licorne aux forces 
françaises en Côte d’Ivoire,” accessed July 14, 2019, http://fr.calameo.com/ 
read/004151978987729f45fdd. 
76  In October 2002, claiming that there was foreign involvement in the insurgency (Burkina 
Faso, Liberia, and Libya), the Ivorian president invoked the defence accords. Despite 
Gbagbo’s argumentation, France refused to intervene on the side of the Ivorian 
government, opting instead for peacekeeping. In Wyss, “The Gendarme Stays.” 
77  Wyss, “The Gendarme Stays.”  
78  Arthur Boutellis, “The Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key 
to Peace,” International Peace Institute, accessed March 17, 2019, 
https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_epub_cote_d_ivoire.pdf. 
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controlled by the French troops. This was one of the decisive factors that 
prevented Gbagbo’s regime from overthrowing in Côte d’Ivoire.
79
 
The reluctance to engage actively in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict must be 
seen in the wider historical context of criticism of French support for dictatorial 
regimes or the intervention of French troops during the Rwanda genocide in 
1994. Equally, France’s greater involvement in NATO structures and European 
integration processes and the creation of economic and monetary union 
contributed to this, which, however, required lower public spending and greater 
transparency. These aspects have severely limited France to maintaining equally 
superior relations with African countries. 
According to Pierre Haski, the cause of France’s neutral attitude towards 
the coup can also be seen in view of the opportunistic French policy towards 
Côte d’Ivoire. France maintained strong ties with Côte d’Ivoire’s political elites, 
and thus managed to ensure for itself a strong influence in the country, even 
with any change of leadership. President Gbagbo had many allies among the 
members of the French Socialist Party, who later condemned the illegality of 
the presidential election in 2000. His main opponent, Alassane Ouattara, was 
close to neoliberal French politicians, including Nicolas Sarkozy.
80
 The main 
objective of the French intervention was to exert pressure on Côte d’Ivoire’s 
political leaders to jointly discuss the disputed issue of Ivoirité, which caused 
disruption within the country. In fact, France was aware that a stable situation in 
Côte d’Ivoire could not be restored by military intervention, so it clearly 
favoured a political solution to the Ivory crisis.
81
 However, a critical analysis of 
the conflict resolution strategy reveals a discrepancy in France’s allegedly 
neutral position.
82
 Following the launch of Operation Licorne, France provided 
logistical support to Côte d’Ivoire and brokered the so-called Côte d’Ivoire’s 
confidence zone. The demarcation of the confidence zone did not reflect the 
univocal ethnic and cultural stratification of the population, as most people 
known as “foreigners” now live in the southwest of the country. 
                                               
79  At the time of the outbreak of the conflict, the north of the country was under the 
administration of rebel groups, while the south was controlled by the Côte d’Ivoire Armed 
Forces (FANCI), which were loyal to President Gbagbo.  Several groups operated in the 
area against Gbagbo’s regime. Their union created new Côte d’Ivoire political force – 
Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire (FNCI), whose main representative was Alassane 
Ouattara. Alassane Ouattara was no new person in Côte d’Ivoire’s political environment. 
He was the last prime minister of the president Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s administrative 
in the period 1990-1993. However, in 2000, he could not stand as president because of the 
controversial law surrounding the Ivoirité concept, which classified him as a non-native of 
Côte d’Ivoire. In Peace Insight, “Ivory Coast: Conflict profile,” accessed March 5, 2019, 
https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/ivory-coast/. 
80  Pierre Haski, “Ivory Coast’s real battle,” The Guardian, accessed April 10, 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jan/04/ivory-coast-real-battle. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Bovcon, “France’s Conflict Resolution.” 
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An important milestone in the Ivory conflict was the signing of the Linas-
Marcoussis agreements
83
 on January 24, 2003, with the participation of French 
President Jacques Chirac and all parties involved in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict, 
where they agreed to maintain the integrity of Côte d’Ivoire and create a 
transitional National Reconciliation Government.
84
 The most important thing 
was to remove the disputed Article 35 of the Constitution,
85
 under which 
Alassane Ouattara could not be elected in the presidential election, as under this 
article the parents of the presidential candidate had to be born in Côte d’Ivoire.
86
 
However, at the same time, Gbagbo came up with the initiative of ‘own’ 
solutions for Côte d’Ivoire. All the changes were made on the basis of the 
Ouagadougou Political Agreement signed on March 4, 2007,
87
 which in 
addition to completing the DDR program, also caused the suppression of the 
confidence zone and the gradual replacement of UNOCI and Licorne’s impartial 
forces by mixed forces consisting of rebellious Côte d’Ivoire rebel fighters and 
soldiers. By doing so, France’s position in Côte d’Ivoire had considerably 
weakened since the 2002 military intervention.
88
 Despite the efforts, solving the 
internal political conflict in Côte d’Ivoire still did not have real contours and the 
presidential elections at the end of 2010 did not contribute to the improvement 
of the situation. 
                                               
83  Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Ouagadougou Agreement,” accessed August 15, 2019, 
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/IVO%2020070304.pdf. 
84  The main task of this interim government was to ensure free and fair elections after the 
rebel groups were disarmed, the total demobilization and re-integration of Côte d’Ivoire – 
a program also known as DDR. In Stephanie Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed May 4, 2019, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-ddr-
africa. 
85  In Article 35 The Côte d’Ivoire Constitution of 2000 is stated that “a candidate for a post 
of President must be from Côte d’Ivoire, whose father and mother are also from Côte 
d’Ivoire. He must never give up his Ivory nationality and never claim to have any other 
nationality.” In: Parliament, “Constitution de Côte d’Ivoire 2000,” accessed May 18, 
2019, http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/kotdviuar.pdf.  
86  On February 27, 2004, a full UN peacekeeping operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was 
set up under pressure from the French side, which called for a more concrete international 
intervention from the UN. This mission co-operated in Côte d’Ivoire with the French 
operation Licorne. Despite the efforts of the international community, tensions in Côte 
d’Ivoire escalated. The UN Security Council (UNSC) postponed the presidential elections 
to be held in the country at the end of 2006, extended UNOCI’s mandate and the French 
mission of Licorne and, on a proposal from France, gave the Prime Minister of the interim 
government more authority. In United Nations, “UNOCI United Nations Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire,” accessed April 15, 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unoci.shtml.  
87  United Nations Security Council, “Ouagadougou Political Agreement,” accessed May 20, 
2019, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d%27Ivoire%20S2007144.pdf.  
88  Wyss, “The Gendarme Stays in Africa,” 81-111. 
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The strong political determinant of the example of Côte d’Ivoire was that 
Houphouët-Boigny maintained strong relations with France as the head of the 
country. These links were strengthened after independence by the growing 
number of French technical assistants in all major sectors of the economy. The 
constant presence of French military forces in Côte d’Ivoire has practically 
decimated home military units that have not been able to adequately defend 
their own territory. 
Despite the complicated French-Ivory relationship analysis, France 
remains the most important trade partner of Côte d’Ivoire. Many French 
expatriates have returned to Côte d’Ivoire and several French firms have been 
restored, such as Bouygues in the energy sector and France Télécom in 
telecommunications. The involvement of the UN and ECOWAS as well as the 
EU and the African Union in the conflict resolution strategy has not weakened 
French influence in Côte d’Ivoire. Taking into consideration the reduced 
military budget of France, the multilateral peacekeeping operation helped 
France reduce the cost of military intervention in favour of enforcement of its 
national interests. 
On the following chart (Chart 2) we can see how the number of French 
military units developed under Operation Licorne. The significantly higher 
frequency of the French military presence in 2004 and 2010-2011 is due to the 
circumstances in the Côte d’Ivoire’s internal political scene, when the most 
massive escalation of the crisis, which required French intervention to stabilize 
the conflict, occurred. Operation Licorne was officially closed on January 21, 
2015,
89
 which supports our claims regarding improving the situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire as well as the development of France’s current foreign policy, which is 
trying to leave peacekeeping to the Ivory military. 
However, like Richard Moncrieff in his study,
90
 we disagree with most of 
the interpretations that indicate that French interventionism in Côte d’Ivoire was 
inadequate.
91
 According to such interpretations, the French attitude to the Côte 
d’Ivoire conflict reflects France’s “confused” African policy, whose execution 
has been an obstacle to rivalry between the various interest groups on the 
French political scene. It is true that France’s response to the Côte d’Ivoire 
crisis has not been so active, but we also observe the extreme ambiguity of 
Laurent Gbagbo’s policy towards France caused by the constant review of his 
position and the adaptation of his real political intentions. 
                                               
89  Ministère de la Défense, “Dossier de présentation de l'opération Licorne.” 
90  Richard Moncrieff, “French Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa Under President Sarkozy,” 
SAIIA Occasional Paper no. 107, January 2012, accessed May 20, 2019, 
http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/french-relations-with-sub-saharan-africa-under-
president-sarkozy.  
91  Bovcon, “France’s Conflict Resolution.” 
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Ruth Marshall also claims that French involvement in the conflict is 
disadvantaged by its significant former colonial supremacy, which ultimately 
strengthened the current ultranationalist sentiments of some Côte d’Ivoire 
residents, including “young patriots”.
92
 It was the ambiguity of the French 
relationship with his former colony that offered Gbagbo an opportunity to 
challenge every decision made by France or other entities. He used a strong 
mobilization discourse on “the fight against French neo-colonialism”. However, 
the fact remains that France is an integral part of Côte d’Ivoire’s history. 
 
 
Current situation in Côte d’Ivoire 
  
The crisis that paralyzed the country in 2002 was not a unique 
phenomenon in this geopolitical environment. Côte d’Ivoire found itself on the 
verge of civil conflict early in 2011, when then President Laurent Gbagbo 
refused to acknowledge the defeat in the second round of the presidential 
election.
93
 However, the security situation has improved considerably since 
2011, and the UN Security Council’s 14-year peace mission ended on June 30, 
2017 based on Resolution 2284.
94
 The UNSC in Resolution 2283, also adopted 
unanimously, immediately withdrew sanctions against Côte d’Ivoire involving 
an arms embargo, a travel ban on designated persons and the freezing of their 
property. The UNSC resolution welcomes “the remarkable progress of Côte 
d’Ivoire to achieve lasting peace and stability as well as economic prosperity.”
95
 
It also appreciates the successful presidential elections of October 2015, in 
which Ouattara has clearly won after economic growth during his first term of 
office as a crucial turning point in strengthening long-term peace and stability in 
the country.
96
 
                                               
92  Ruth Marshall, “La France en Côte d’Ivoire: l'interventionnisme à l’épreuve des faits,” 
Politique africaine, 2005/2 (n. 98), p. 21-41, https://doi.org/10.3917/polaf.098.0021. 
93  Alassane Ouattara was victorious in the second round of the presidential election. 
Ouattara after all took over the office in May 2011. Gbagbo was detained and is currently 
facing accusations of participation in the violence before the International Criminal Court, 
which claimed more than 3,000 lives after the 2010 elections. In Arthur Boutellis, “The 
Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to Peace,” International 
Peace Institute, accessed March 17, 2019, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/publications/ipi_epub_cote_d_ivoire.pdf. 
94  At the end of February, there were a total of about 4,650 soldiers and military observers 
and nearly 1,400 police officers. In United Nations, “UNOCI United Nations Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire.” 
95  United Nations, “Security Council Authorizes Final Extension for United Nations 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, Welcoming Country’s ‘Remarkable’ Progress,” accessed July 
14, 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12342.doc.htm. 
96  United Nations, “28 April 2016 - Côte d’Ivoire: End of UN mission and lift of UN 
sanctions in Cote d’Ivoire,” accessed July 15, 2019, https://onu.delegfrance.org/End-of-
UN-mission-and-lift-of-UN-sanctions-in-Cote-d-Ivoire.  
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This development highlights the progress of the West African country in 
peace after a long period of instability and political crisis. After independence from 
the French colonial administration in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire was the world’s leading 
exporter of cocoa with a thriving economy. This has changed over the ten years of 
the Civil War, as is also seen in Chart 1. Nevertheless, after returning to political 
stability in 2012, the country became one of the fastest growing economies of sub-
Saharan Africa. After reaching a GDP growth rate of approximately 9% in three 
consecutive years, it is obvious that Côte d’Ivoire still exceeds the regional average 
of sub-Saharan Africa, as confirmed by data from Credendo.
97
 
The biggest shift in the region’s relations with France since independence is 
for many experts the transition of the eight West African states
98
 from the CFA 
franc
99
 in favour of a new currency eco. Alassane Ouattara was a strong supporter 
of the CFA franc, maintaining its stability and solidity. As Pilling highlights, the 
currency transition to the eco is more political than economic, as CFA franc was 
perceived as the part of the French continuing hegemony in region. Thanks to this 
shift, France can possibly rid of its “neo-colonial” tendencies and abandon the 
controversial nuance of linkage to the Françafrique legacy.
100
 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
The African continent is full of paradoxes. We find poverty in it – caused 
by an inhospitable natural environment, unfavourable demographic conditions, 
worsening political situation, and a lack of economic development. However, 
                                               
97  Credendo, “Vratké success story zo západnej Afriky,” accessed May 12, 2019, 
https://www.credendo.com/sk/country_risk_assessment/cote-divoire/vratke-success-story-
zo-zapadnej-afriky.  
98  Namely Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Togo and Guinea-
Bissau do not have to keep half their reserves in France or have a French emissary 
occupying a seat on their central bank. In David Pilling, “A revolution in Africa’s 
relations with France is afoot,” Financial Times, accessed May 7, 2020, 
https://www.ft.com/content/8894ad6e-2650-11ea-9a4f-963f0ec7e134. 
99  A currency acronym originally stood for Colonies françaises d’Afrique (CFA). In: David 
Pilling, “A revolution in Africa’s relations with France is afoot,” Financial Times, 
accessed May 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/8894ad6e-2650-11ea-9a4f-963f0ec7e134. 
100  The Françafrique concept was first used by Félix Houphouët-Boigny to define the 
interconnection of countries that gained independence from their former colonizer. 
However, in post-colonial decades, this notion had largely no positive connotations. Due 
to the incidents in Rwanda and Zair (nowadays Democratic Republic of the Congo), as 
well as the supply of arms to Angola, which portrayed France as a harmful player in the 
African environment, the concept changed fundamentally in terms of content and defined 
rather “unfair French conditions. in Africa.” In Pierre Péan, “France-Afrique, 
Françafrique, France à fric?,” Revue internationale et stratégique, 2012/1 (n. 85), 117-
124, https://doi.org/10.3917/ris.085.0117. 
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we can also find extraordinary wealth there – in the context of the diverse 
natural potential and mineral resources that encourage the world’s advanced 
economies to take a prominent position in this strategic space to declare their 
power status, starting with the initial efforts to colonize Africa and ending with 
Africa itself being able to take full responsibility for the continent. 
France as a hegemonic leader in the sub-Saharan region was aware that 
African policy in the traditional understanding no longer makes such a 
significant contribution as it did in the past, and needs to develop a novel 
approach that reflects the new political environment and preserves the French 
influence on the African continent. As Lombart highlights, a more pronounced 
shift in France’s African policy occurred after Jacques Chirac succeeded in the 
presidential election in 1995, as it was described in the second chapter. Indeed, 
the very political situation on the African continent has undergone considerable 
development and the strategy of French military policy in Africa has changed as 
well.
101
 We must acknowledge that the position of French diplomacy in African 
affairs is currently very complicated, as one of the few countries to have the 
political will and technical arsenal in the case of conflict to provide stability and 
peace in African countries. For this reason, France is criticized for its neo-
colonial tendencies, according to which, under the pretext of ensuring peaceful 
conditions in the French-speaking African region, France pursues its own 
political and economic interests. Based on the theoretical model of neo-
colonialism from which we drew in the research, we can identify a univocal 
military involvement of France in its former African colonies which was the 
main objective of the paper of analysing the continued French influence in 
Africa. However, the most recent development of French policy towards Africa 
suggests that a change in the rhetoric of the current presidential administration, 
as well as a decreasing number of the military presence, could represent a real 
turn in the mutual relations. The current French president Emmanuel Macron 
wants to focus more on education support, and infrastructure development 
rather than on active military engagement on the African continent, thereby 
building a new phase of Franco-African relations. 
An essential part of this paper was the analysis of possible French neo-
colonial ties on the example of one of the most flourishing colonies in 
francophone Africa – Côte d’Ivoire. According to Bovcon, conflict resolution in 
Côte d’Ivoire is one of the most recent examples of “hybrid operations” in 
which a former colonial power plays a substantial role. The legitimacy of 
France’s military operation lies primarily in the fact of the belated intervention 
by the regional and international actors. However, reasons for the Ivorian crisis 
are partly rooted in the colonial past of the French management of Ivorian 
                                               
101  Laurent Lombart, “La politique extérieure du président Jacques Chirac dans un monde américano-
centré,” accessed April 20, 2019, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/24_Lombart.pdf.  
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territory and society, which were continued after the independence by the 
Houphouët-Boigny regime. Thus, we admit that France is far from being a neutral 
party in the current conflict resolution strategy and may, to some extent, rule out the 
true reconciliation process. As we declared, France has played a decisive role in 
defining Côte d’Ivoire’s political, economic, and social structure in the 20th 
century, given the presence of a historic French foreign policy towards the African 
continent. The gradual categorization of the population and the hierarchy of ethnic 
groups within the local population was the basis for the development of capitalism. 
The French colonial administration is therefore certainly partly responsible for 
inciting ethnic conflict in the country. 
The main limitations of the presented paper result in a rather restricted 
understanding of neo-colonialism which might fail to consider certain more 
subtle aspects of neo-colonial practises. However, this facilitates focusing on 
the core substance of neo-colonialism in our perspective of the security-political 
determinant. Due to time and space constraints, the analysis only provided a 
minimal amount of important cases of economic influence in order to prove the 
presence of neo-colonialism at the military level. The space for discussion may 
not be whether a neo-colonial model is present, which we have demonstrated 
based on our contribution. It is present not only in the political-security 
determinant that was the subject under scrutiny, but also in the economic or 
cultural field. Due to the limited scope of the paper, it was not possible to 
devote the same space to each of these subtopics, but the main fragments of 
individual forms of neo-colonialism in the work were projected. We have 
chosen a military aspect, which from our point of view is little discussed. 
However, it is appropriate to ask whether the former colonial power is at all 
able to get rid of the accusations of neo-colonial practices. To speak of France, 
which during the colonial era used direct colonial rule while interacting with its 
colonies, is not easy to limit mutual linkage after a long-lasting presence in the 
region. Therefore, the conclusion of our contribution remains a clear provability 
of neo-colonial ties that does not necessarily have to be perceived as wrong, and 
it is appropriate to open a discussion on whether and under what conditions it is 
possible to get rid of these tendencies. By words of Jean-Christophe Rufin, 
former ambassador to Senegal, he believes that “the old, shadowy, 
compromising, cynical habits of trading political and business favours have just 
gotten more manipulative and opaque.”
102
 Replacing direct rule for substantial 
influence may not be “colonial” per se, but neither is it a decisive break from 
the past.”
103
 As one the key element of the ‘less dependence’ that Huxley 
                                               
102  Bruce Crumley, “Ambassador Blasts France’s Relations with its African Allies,” accessed 
March 23, 2020, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2002788,00.html.  
103  Benneyworth, “The Ongoing Relationship.” 
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mentions is that “education could be the most important factor in the future 
destiny of the continent.”
104
 
It is highly possible that if there is no open conflict on the African 
continent in the near future, French foreign policy towards Africa will be based 
on humanitarian aid, support for education and the development of economic 
relations, which is confirmed by the fact that the establishment of peace in 
African countries has taken place to reduce French troops in the area. We have 
declared this as an example of Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire in the final 
part of the paper. After stabilizing the tense internal political situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire, the country is now considered a positive example of Franco-African 
relations. We assume that civil wars, enormous loss of life, and worsening 
economic and political situation are a memento for leaders of African countries 
not to repeat such events from history in the future. It is important to stress that 
as long as the regional and international institutions are not able to assume the 
desired leading role in the conflict resolution strategies, the former colonial 
powers will have to play a central role, despite all the possible suspicions and 
accusations of the neo-colonial practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
104  For deeper analysis, see Laurence M. Hauptman, Africa View: John Collier, The British 
Colonial Service and American Indian Policy, 1933-1945 (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 
Ltd., 1986), 372. 
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Annexes 
 
Figure 1. Cocoa production in Côte d’Ivoire in period 1960-2015 
Source: A Euromoney Institutional Investor Company, “Ivory Coast Industrial Production.” 
 
 
 
Figure 2. French military presence during Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2015) 
Source: Ministère de la Défense, “Dossier de présentation de l'opération Licorne aux forces 
françaises en Côte d’Ivoire.” 
 
 
 
 
 
